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POWER OF A LIFE TENANT TO DISPOSE
OF A FEE'
WALTER L. SUMMERS*
A man whose property is so limited in extent that he cannot
feel reasonably sure that the interest therein created by law for
the benefit of his widow will be sufficient for her maintenance
and support under all circumstances naturally seeks to make
proper provision for her by will. Such a testator, if he has
children, finds himself between two conflicting desires. He is
anxious that his wido~w have proper support during her lifetime,
but at the same time he also desires that his children have the
residue of the estate upon her death. He is somewhat reluctant
to give the wife a fee and disinherit his children; he fears a life
estate with a remainder in fee will not meet all exegencies of the
widow's needs, so he attempts to strike between the two by giving
the widow a life estate with power to dispose of such of the prop-
erty as may be necessary for her maintenance, with a gift of the
residue to his children. Such a will, if properly drawn, may very
well accomplish the intent of the testator without the necessity
of litigation to determine its legal effect. Such wills, however,
are not always carefully drawn, and the result has been a great
mass of litigation in which the decisions of the courts have not
been altogether harmonious. An attempt will be made to point
out and clarify, from the standpoint of both reason and authority,
some of the chief controversies arising out of situations of this
sort.
I The substance of this article was presented in an address to the Gary
Bar Association in 1929.
* See biographical note, page 178.
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The opportunities for error in testamentary dispositions of
this sort are numerous. The nature of the estate of the first
taker, the creation and extent of the power, and the validity of
the gift by way of remainder, must necessarily depend upon the
language of the will. In the construction of wills the courts are
guided by the well understood principle that the intention of the
testator as gathered from the four torners of the will must con-
trol, but this intention, when clearly apparent, cannot be per-
mitted to override settled principles of property law and result
in the creation of impossible legal situations.
The first problem concerns itself with the nature of the estate
or interest of the first taker. If a testator devises property td
his wife and her heirs, or to her generally, with a power to dis-
pose of the fee, and a gift over of what is left to his children,
the widow takes a fee. The words creating the power are mere
surplusage and the remainder is void, although a testator might
be surprised to find that such was his intention. The reason is,
that the gift to the widow simplicter, or to the widow and her
heirs, creates a fee, and by the creation of the fee in her the
testator has thereby created in her powers to dispose of the fee,
and any other further expression of intent to that effect is use-
less. The fee being in existence the remainder must be invalid
because of the rule that a remainder cannot be engrafted upon a
fee. (It cannot be good as an executory devise because there is
'no contingency stated upon which the interest of the widow is to
be divested.) The above conclusions are in perfect accord with
the settled rules of law in all jurisdictions including Indiana.
The courts of this state have, in numerous cases, quoted and
adopted the well known statement of Chancellor Kent where he
says: "A devise of an estate generally, or indefinitely, with a
power of disposition over it carries a fee."
If, however, a testator devises land to his wife expressly for
life, or by such language that it can be ascertained that a life
estate is intended, she takes a life estate only, despite the fact
that he adds to the life interest a general power to dispose of a
fee in the property. by deed or will. A gift over by way of re-
mainder of "what is left", "what remains undisposed of", "or
remains unexpended" is valid, subject, however, to be defeated
wholly or in part by a proper exercise of the power by the life
tenant. This is settled law in England and in a great majority
of jurisdictions in this country, including Indiana. A contrary
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view is held in Virginia, West Virginia and Tennessee. The rule
has, to some extent, been modified by statute in a few states.
In his Commentaries, Chancellor Kent, in speaking of the
nature of the legal interest created by gift of a life estate with an
added power to dispose of a fee, said: "Where the estate is given
for life only, the devisee takes only an estate for life, though a
power of disposition, or to appoint the fee by deed or will, be
annexed; unless there would be some manifest general intent of
the testator, which would be defeated by adhering to this partic-
ular intent."
Whenever the question as to the nature of the estate created
by such a testamentary disposition has been raised in those
jurisdictions following the so-called majority rule the courts have
invariably relied upon the rule as stated by Kent. This statement
has been quoted and paraphrased in several Indiana cases, al-
though in many of them the court was not put to the necessity
of deciding whether a life estate plus a general power to dispose
of a fee created a fee simple, for the reason the only question
involved was whether the life tenant could convey a fee and she
would have this power in either alternative. In a few cases the
question has been squarely presented. Thus in Foudry v.
Foudry,2 the first taker brought a suit to quiet title claiming a
fee. The court in denying the action said: "This instrument
by certain and express terms, gave to Martha E. Clark a life
estate, with full power of disposition. It is held that in such
particular case the devisee for life will not take a fee notwith-
standing the gift of a power of disposition."
In Beatson v. Bowers,3 the court said: "Mary Bowers had no
interest in fee, but had, by the conveyance to her, a naked power
of appointment, and had the appointment been made without
pecuniary benefit to herself it would have been valid. The power
is not an estate, and does not imply ownership or an estate, nor
does it enlarge a life estate into a fee."
In this last mentioned case the Indiana court cited with ap-
proval, Burleigh v. CloUgh,4 wherein the validity of a remainder
was attacked upon the ground the life estate and the power to
convey the fee merged together to create a 'fee in the first taker
and made the remainder bad as a fee on a fee. The New Hamp-
2 44 Ind. App. 444.
3 174 Ind. 601.
4 52 N. E. 267.
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shire court answered this contention by saying that the power
created was not an estate or property and therefore could not
merge with the life estate. This statement has likewise been
greatly relied upon by other courts as sound support of the gen-
eral rule.
This hasty survey of the authorities shows that the Indiana
court and others following the majority rule base their decisions
that a life estate accompanied by a general power of disposition
does not enlarge into a fee upon two general reasons. The first
is, that the intention of the testator should be controlling. They
find the intention of the testator to create only a life estate by
the express gift of a life estate, and that proof of such intention
is strengthened by the gift by way of remainder to his heirs or
children. The second reason is, that granting the intention might
be overcome by merger of the power and the life interest, the
merger cannot take place because a power being only an author-
ity cannot merge with the life interest, which is an estate or
property.
Before offering any criticism of these reasons it is perhaps
advisable to turn to the minority view to see upon what theory
it is held that a fee is created by a gift of this sort. This view
owes its existence to a misunderstanding by the courts of Vir-
ginia, West Virginia, and Tennessee of an early decision of the
Virginia court in BurwelZ v. Anderson.5 The court in that case
stated that in absence of any inconsistent grant or devise, a gift
of a complete power of disposition of property was equal to the
direct conveyance of a fee. Later decisions in that jurisdiction,
and in the other states mentioned, apparently understood this
statement to mean that a gift of a general power of disposition
by deed or will, even when accompanied by an express gift of a
life estate, would override any expressed intent to give a life
estate and, therefore, constitute a fee. Whether the courts in
these decisions depend wholly upon the notion that the gift of
the power is the controlling intent, or give some weight to the
notion that there is a merger of the life estate and the po~ver to
produce a fee, is difficult to determine. If they depend upon the
former theory they find a different intent and -reach a result
directly contrary to that laid down by Chancellor Kent, but if
they depend upon merger as overriding intent, their holdings are
5 3 Leigh 348.
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squarely contrary to the reasons advanced against merger in
Burleigh v. Clough.
Where a deed or will of the type now under discussion, that is,
where the estate for life is expressly given with an added power
to dispose of the fee by deed or will, and a gift of the residue is
made to a third person, usually the donor's children, the intent
of the testator or grantor can hardly be misunderstood. Under
the holdings of the majority of the courts in England and this
country this very evident intent of the grantor or testator is
carried out. Perhaps the average practicing lawyer when con-
fronted with the examination of a title to the land involved would
be satisfied with the rule and its reasons as stated above. Cer-
tainly in the face of the long line of decisions in this state, he
would not be justified in encouraging litigation in order to try
out some of his own pet theories before the courts. It costs
nothing, however, to dig a little deeper into the reasons given
by the courts and satisfy one's own curiosity as to their sound-
ness.
The controversy here is one between a rule of intention and
a rule of law. If the situation is such that the rule of law applies
there is not much controversy about it. The rule of intention
involved is that the intention of a testator controls. The rule of
law is that property interests presently vested in the same per-
son in respect to the same land or chattels merge into a single in-
terest. Thus where an owner of a reversion in fee buys in an out-
standing life estate he takes the fee presently. A might convey
Blackacre to B, and C at the same time convey an outstanding
easement in the same land to B, with the expressed intention in
the deed that there be no merger, yet merger results. It is only
natural to expect then, that if one has a present estate for life
in a tract of land and also a complete power to dispose of the fee
in that land by deed or will, that such parson will insist that he
has a fee simple, for, on the first impression, he seems to have
about all the fee simple owner has. In the application the Rule
against Perpetuities to powers, such a person is treated as the
owner of the land for the purpose of estimating the period of
remoteness.
The majority rule says that intent controls and there is no
merger because a power does not merge. The reason given why
there is no merger is that it is not a property but an authority.
The minority rule, at least indirectly, says there is a merger be-
cause the gift of the power is the whole thing and controls and
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swallows up the life estate. If there is a merger it will control.
It is submitted that the reasons in the majority, as well as the
minority decisions, are unsatisfactory. To prove this assertion
it is necessary to briefly examine the nature of a life estate, of
an estate in fee, and of a general power of appointment.
A life tenant, as here considered, has legal rights, privileges,
powers and immunities in respect to a particular tract of land
to which relations are correlative the respective duties, no-rights,
liabilities and disabilities of all other persons. By the reason of
the existence of these legal relations the life tenant may prevent
intrusions upon the land by all others, and he may use the land
as he pleases, provided he does not commit a nuisance or injure
the inheritance through the commission of waste. The foregoing
rights and privileges are, of course, limited to the life time of
the tenant. By virtue of his legal powers he may destroy all of
his legal relations in respect to the land and recreate similar
relations in others, and he has immunities against the destruc-
tion of his interest by others, subject of course to the power of
the state to take the land for public purposes.
The tenant in fee likewise has rights, privileges, powers and
immunities in respect to the particular land. His rights like
those of the life tenant, are limited for the period of his life. His
privileges are no different from those of the life tenant, except
that they are not limited by the doctrine of waste. It becomes
at once apparent that the most important difference between the
legal interest of a life tenant and a tenant in fee lies in the char-
acter of their power-immunity relations. The tenant in fee has
powers to dispose of the fee by deed, by will, and by descent,
while the life tenant only has powers to dispose of such interest
as he has. What is it that the tenant in fee has that the life
tenant does not have? It is this, powers to create powers in
others to transmit by will, by deed or by descent. In other words,
the fundamental difference in the nature of an estate for life and,
an estate in fee is in the fact that the fee simple owner has
powers to pass his interest on to his heirs by descent, and when
he transfers his estate or interest to others by any proper legal
act he transfers to them powers to transmit by descent.
If then there be added to the legal relations of a life tenant
general powers to dispose of the fee by deed or will the result is
not a fee for the simple reason that such life tenant does not
have powers to transmit a fee by descent, the very essence of a
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fee. He may create a fee, but he does not have a fee. If he dies
his heirs will get nothing.
It is on this reasoning that it is contended that the minority
rule is wrong, for granting that a general gift to dispose of the
fees by deed or will is the intent of the testator such a gift does
not properly describe a fee. It is likewise contended that the
courts holding to the majority rule could have disposed of the
contention about merger by admitting a merger and showing by
this simple process of addition that the result could not be a fee.
The courts sustaining the majority rule have elected, however,
to meet the issue about merger by declaring that merger does not
take place. The reason given is, that only property interests
merge and that a power being merely an authority and not a
property interest does not merge. It must be noticed, however,
that the very powers involved here are legal relations in rem
respecting land and they are an essential ingredient of a fee. It
is hard to believe that they are not property relations. The state-
ment that a power is an authority is, of course, merely defining a
power in its own terms, and meaningless for the present purpose.
The reasoning of the courts here is about as conclusive and con-
vincing as the conclusions of that great investigator who devoted
his life to research upon the subject of the "fiery flying serpents
in the wilderness", with special attention to their origin and
subsequent history. His conclusions, as stated in his own words,
were: "They was there all the time, and they stayed where they
was."
It is believed that the courts are correct in holding that the
life interest and powers do not merge, but that their reasons are
by no means convincing.
If A gives a life estate to B with the addition of express powers
to dispose of his life interest in the land, the added powers, do
not merge for the simple reason that the added words granting
the power are meaningless. They pretend to give the life tenant
something which he already has and which the grantor did not
have at the time. If on the other hand the life tenant is given
additional powers to dispose of the fee, legal relations are created
which the life tenant did not get by the creation of the life estate
and which the devisor had and had powers to create. Now why
is it that these powers do not merge with the life estate to create
a fee? The answer is simple. It is because a merger of property
interest to take place must produce a legal interest in land known
to the law. These relations combined do not constitute a life
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estate, a base or qualified fee, or a fee simple. The sum is more
than a life estate and less than a fee. We call it exactly what it
is, a life estate with a general power to dispose of the fee by deed
or will. The name is somewhat unhandy but that cannot be
helped.
A second important question arising in connection with testa-
mentary dispositions of this sort, and one in respect to which
there is considerable confusion and contrariety of view is, What
language is necessary to create a power to dispose of a fee? Here
the problem is wholly one of gathering the intention of the
testator from the language of the will. The difficulty lies in the
fact that there are various rules for the determination of inten-
tion which sometimes lead to opposite conclusions when applied
to a given situation. Of course if the deed or will expressly pro-
vides that the life tenant may dispose of the fee there is no ques-
tion about the intention, but many grantors and testators, or
their attorneys, are not so careful as to make this direct state-
ment. A power to dispose of a fee does not, however, need be
expressly given, but it may be implied from certain other pro-
visions, from the context as a whole.
If the life interest is expressly given and a power to dispose
of the property is added, although it does not expressly state that
the fee may be disposed of, and there is a gift over to the testa-
tor's children, or his heirs, of "what is left", "what remains un-
expended", or words of similar import, it is held in most jurisdic-
tions, including Indiana, that a power to dispose of a fee is
intended and therefore created. This conclusion is supported
first by the fact that any words creating a power in the life ten-
ant to dispose of his own life estate are meaningless and mere
surplusage because he already has such power, and further by
the fact that the language creating a remainder in what is left
or unexpended clearly indicates that the testator contemplates
that the property may be partially or entirely disposed of by the
life tenant. The application of these principles may be made
clearer by reference to some of the cases.
In Clark v. Middleswort&,6 the will provided: "I hereby will
and bequeath and devise all of my property, real and personal,
to my wife, Mary A. Clark, during her life, and at her death,
should anything remain, the same to be divided among my heirs
at law." Here it will be noticed that there are no direct words of
6 82 Ind. 240.
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any sort creating a power to dispose of the property in any man-
ner, the court held, however, that the wife took a life estate with
power to dispose of the fee, and that a purchaser from her se-
cured a fee simple interest cutting off the remainder to the heirs.
"We think", said the court, "it quite clear that the will of A. B.
Clark gave to his widow, Mary A. Clark, a life estate in said lot,
and that it also gave her by clearest implication, a power to dis-
pose of the same. The words 'at her death, should anything
remain,' are senseless and without meaning, unless the testator
intended that the tenant for life might, prior to her death, dis-
pose of the property devised to her for her life. The words
clearly show that he must have contemplated this at the time,
and therefore, have intended it."
In Silver v. Canry,7 where the facts were similar to those
in Clark v. Middlesworth, the court in holding that the life
tenant had a power to dispose of the fee in absence of express
words creating such a power, said: "We think this case is gov-
erned by Clark v. Middlesworth, and upon the authority of that
case the widow had the power to convey the fee. It will be ob-
served that the words 'what may not be consumed of real and
personal estate at my wife's decease' found in item one of the
will, are quite as strong as those used in the case referred to,
and in addition to this it must be borne in mind that in all subse-
quent items of the will the testator is careful to limit the estate
devised to property not 'herein otherwise appropriated.'"
The gift of the remainder has been pointed out in a number
of Indiana cases of especial importance in determining the na-
ture of the power. Thus in Wiley v. Gregory,8 where a testator
gave his wife all of his real and personal property "to be and
remain hers during her natural life, to use, enjoy and dispose
of as she may desire, and after her death all that remains undis-
posed of by her, I desire to be equally divided among my chil-
dren." The court in holding that the widow might dispose of the
fee said: "We think, too, that we are warranted in saying that
where a testator, in his will creates what purports to be a life
estate, and devises a remainder to another, the devise of the
remainder is of controlling influence in ascertaining his inten-
tion."
Many other interesting cases in Indiana and other jurisdic-
tions might be examined to illustrate the length to which the
7 109 Ind. 267.
8 135 Ind. 647.
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courts go in the examination of the language of a will to find an
intention on the part of the testator to create a power to dispose
of the fee. McMillan v. Deering,9 is a particularly interesting
case.
Where a will does not expressly create a power to dispose of
the fee but contains language to the effect that the life tenant
may dispose of the property for the maintenance of herself and
her children or the education of the latter, it is held in some
jurisdictions that she may dispose of the fee of such of the prop-
erty as is necessary for these purposes. Thus in Kaufman v.
Brekenridge,0 where a will gave the widow an estate for life,
"to be disposed of and used agreeably to her direction and ap-
proval, and in such manner as she may determine most conducive
to the welfare and comfortable subsistence of herself and our
beloved children," the court held the widow had a power to dis-
pose of the fee to this end.
And in a Kentucky case, Morse v. Cross,"1 where the will after
a gift of a life estate continued, "to hold, add to, or dispose of at
her own discretion, during her life or widowhood, for the pur-
pose of keeping together and raising my children that are yet
unmarried," it was held that the life tenant might convey the fee
to carry out the object of the will.
The Indiana court has not squarely held that such an expres-
sion of intention will imply the creation of a power to convey the
fee, although there was an opportunity to do so in Frazier V.
Hassey.'2 In that case the will gave the widow certain property
for life to "dispose of the same as she may think best for the
interest and comfort of herself and my children." The court
conceded the widow had ample power to dispose of the fee but
held that it was not properly exercised. In John v. Bradbury,1 3
the court suggested that a will by a life tenant of all the property
to her relations to the exclusion of her husband's children was
not "necessary for her comfort and convenience" within the lan-
guage of the will creating the power.
Where there are no express words giving a power to dispose
of a fee, no special context, no power to dispose of the property
for a particular purpose, or no gift over of what remains, from
9 139 Ind. 70.
10 117 Ill. 305.
11 56 Ky. 735.
12 43 Ind. 310.
13 97 Ind. 263.
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which the power to dispose of the fee may be implied, but the
will merely states that the life estate is given "with full power
to dispose of as the life tenant pleases," there is considerable
diversity of opinion as to the true nature of the power. One
view, and perhaps the majority, is that since the life tenant
already has power to dispose of the life interest the added words
giving a power to dispose of the property are meaningless unless
they refer to the disposition of the fee. In the leading opinion
expressing a contrary view, Justice Field, in Brant v. Virginia
Coal and Iron Company,14 argues that the interest of the heirs
of the testator of a remainderman expressly given should not be
jeopardized by doubtful expressions, hence words which do not
expressly confer a power to dispose of the fee should be held to
mean a power to dispose of the life interest.
Field's opinion has been severely criticized, particularly by
Professor Rood in an article in 15 Mich. Law Review. If the
controversy is limited to the very facts of the Brant case it seems
that Field must be about right. Practically all of the cases which
Rood cites as being contrary to Field's conclusion are cases
wherein there is a gift over of what is left, or remains unex-
pended, or else there is special context in the will which clearly
establishes an intent to give a power to dispose of the fee. In
one case, at least the Indiana court apparently adopted the notion
of Justice Field, but probably more out of a desire to find some
excuse for a particular holding rather than from a firm convic-
tion of the rectitude of the theory.
In this case, Crew v. Dixon,15 the will provided: "I give,
bequeath and devise to my said wife all of my other property of
every kind, to be held and used by her during her natural life;
the house and lot where I now live to be entirely under her control
as long as she shall live, together with all the furniture in the
same; and the notes that I may have, to be collected by her in her
individual name as they may fall due; the principal of such notes
to be held or invested by her as she may deem proper, with priv-
ilege to use so much thereof as she may deem necessary to carry
on her business or to furnish her a comfortable support. But be-
fore her death I desire her to provide by will or otherwise for a
distribution of whatever may remain in her hands, among her
and my children in such manner as she, in her judgment, shall
14 93 U. S. 326.
15 129 Ind. 85.
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deem best and most equitable; such disposition not to take effect
until after her death."
This will is very little different from a great many others in
Indiana which have been held to create a life interest in the
widow with a special power to appoint the members of a class by
will, and this case would have been so decided, it is believed, had
it not been for certain extrinsic facts. Here the testator had
children by a first wife, and the life tenant, his second wife, like-
wise had children by a previous marriage. The widow elected to
take under her husband's will. She died leaving a will by which
she gave $25 to each of her husband's children and gave all of
the remainder to her own. The court had to find some way to
prevent these step-children of the donor from taking all of the
property. By a long process of reasoning in which it twisted the
words of the will in a painful fashion the court extracted the
intent that the life tenant take the personal property for life with
an absolute power to dispose of it, but that she had a life estate
in the realty, with power to dispose of her life interest only. To
soothe its conscience after avenging the act of this unworthy
step-mother, the court cited Justice Field's opinion in Brant v.
Virginia Coal and Iron Company. Apparently in no other case
in Indiana has this case been followed, although there is language
in Rusk v. Zuck,O intimating a tendency in that direction.
In Foudray v. Foudray,17 the rule of Brant v. Virginia Coal
and Iron Company was urged, but the court, not being bothered
with a stepmother complex, and having in addition a gift over
of what was left or remained to aid it, held that the life tenant
took a power to dispose of the fee.
If the power of a life tenant to dispose of a fee is general, that
is, if the donee of the power can dispose of the estate by deed or
will to any one, then the devises or grantee gets a good fee simple
title. But the power may not be exercisable by both deed and
will, may be exercisable for a particular purpose only, or it may
be a special power to appoint to the members of a class. In all
cases, therefore, the instrument should be closely scrutinized by
the would be purchaser from the life tenant.
Here again reference to a few Indiana decisions will illustrate
the point. In Dunning v. Vandusen,18 where the will gave the
16 147 Ind. 388.
1744 Ind. App. 444.
18 47 Ind. 423.
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property to the wife for life "with power to dispose of it at her
death at her pleasure" the court was of the opinion that the
power was exercisable by will only, although the decision did
not turn on that point.
In John v. Bradbury,19 the will gave to the wife of the testator
all of his property for life to "use, sell and dispose of as she
might see fit for her own comfort and conveniende", with power,
"to sell . . . and convey the same by deed in fee simple if
her necessities or comfort require it," with a gift of the residue
to the testator's children. The life tenant in this case was a
childless second wife. She elected to take under the will and
left a will of her own by which she gave the property to her
relatives and gave the testator's children nothing. It was held
that the power could only be exercised by deed, and then only for
the comfort and convenience of the life tenant, hence the rela-
tives of the life tenant took nothing by her will.
In Beatson v. Bowers, 20 a deed was made to Mary Bowers, wife
of David Bowers, "during her natural life, unless she shall deed
the same to one of the heirs of David Bowers, and, if not so
deeded, at her death the same to revert to David Bowers, if liv-
ing, and if not, to his heirs." After the death of David Bowers
the life tenant conveyed the land by deed to one of the heirs of
David Bowers for a consideration of $1,600. The court held that
this deed did not convey a title on the ground that the life tenant
had a bare power of appointment to one of a class and since it
was exercised for a consideration to the appointor the appoint-
ment was invalid.
It was a rule at common law that an instrument is not to be
regarded as the execution of a power unless the intent to execute
appear either by a reference to the property or the power by the
reason of the fact that it would be ineffectual except as an execu-
tion of the power. The rule in perhaps a majority of the states in
this country, including Indiana, is that the intent to execute the
power need not appear in one of the three ways prescribed by the
common law, but may be gathered, as in any other case, from the
instrument as a whole, taking into consideration all of the cir-
cumstances of its execution.
In Frazier v. Hussey,21 the court held that a power to dispose
of a fee was not properly exercised by a life tenant by a quit
19 97 Ind. 263.
20 147 Ind. 601.
21 43 Ind. 310.
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claim deed. The court reasoned that since the deed purported
to convey nothing more than the interest which the life tenant
had, and made no reference to the power to convey a fee, it con-
veyed no more than the life tenant's interest.
In Dunning v. Vandusen,22 the life tenant conveyed by statu-
tory deed. The deed made no allusion to the power or other
expression of intent to exercise the power, and the court again
held that the deed operated only upon the life interest of the
grantor.
In Clark v. Middlesworh,2"3 the life tenant conveyed the land
by warranty deed. In the first opinion the court followed Dun-
ning v. Vandusen but on rehearing said: "It may not be im-
proper to say that a subsequent examination of the authorities
has convinced us that the deed made to Arthur was a valid execu-
tion of the power. It appears that Arthur paid Mrs. Clark, for
the lot, the sum of $1,450, its fair cash value. This somewhat
distinguishes the case from Dunning v. Vandusen."
Perhaps the best considered case in Indiana on this phase of
the subject is South V. South.24 There- the court, in holding a
warranty deed by a life tenant with power to dispose of a fee,
to be a valid execution of the power said: "A general warranty
deed executed for a consideration equal to the value of the fee
and professing to convey the fee is a valid execution of the power.
This is plainly so on principle, since to hold otherwise would be
to declare that the grantor did not intend to convey the estate
the deed engages him to do, and that the grantee meant to receive
a less estate than that which the deed purports to convey. It
would also involve the absurdity of assuming that the grantor
intended to charge himself with a liability upon his covenants of
warranty in a case where there rested upon him not the slightest
obligation to impose upon himself such responsibility. The au-
thorities, with remarkable unanimity, agree in holding that the
question whether the conveyance is in execution of a power or
not depends solely upon intent. If from the tenor and effect of
the deed or will by which title is conveyed, the intent to execute
the power is inferable, there is a valid execution of the power,
or if, without referring to the power, the will or deed is not
operative as the parties evidently intended it should operate,
22 47 Ind. 423.
23 82 Ind. 240.
24 91 Ind. 221.
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then it will be held a valid and effective execution of the power.
It is not necessary that the power should be referred to in the
deed or will, where the intent is otherwise manifested."
In several later cases the Indiana court has expressed itself to
the same effect.
If all persons desiring to create life tendencies with powers in
the life tenant to dispose of the fee would first consult careful
lawyers who would see to it that the life estate is expressly
created, that it is expressly stated that the life tenant may dis-
pose of the fee, and in what manner the power may be exercised,
and if all life tenants in attempting to exercise such powers
would expressly declare their intention to do so, the litigation
on this subject would be greatly reduced, and this very conven-
ient method of providing for one's wife and family would be
more freely used. But the majority of laymen and lawyers do
not so act and perhaps will not so act in the future, and the
coming generation of lawyers will continue to thrive on the mis-
takes of the past, and provide plenty of "pickings" for those that
follow them.
